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Chapter 12 
Public Attitudes and Support for the 
U in the Wake of the Financial Crisis 
Jennifer R. Wozniak Boyle and Chris Hasselmann 
e economic and financial crisis has dominated the political agenda of both 
,e European Union and its respective governments for the past several years. 
, e economic effects, from rising unemployment to negligible growth rates, 
ave been widely documented and explored. The political consequences 
. wise have been examined in terms of the impact on various national elec-
, ns, especially in Greece and most recently in Germany. One area in need 
attention, however, is the extent to which existing theories and models of 
pport for integration are able to capture the public's changing perception 
the EU. Drawing on a series of Eurobarometer surveys before and after 
crisis began in 2008, we first assess the extent to which support has been 
ected, as well as our ability to model such support. We then explore prefer-
es over which actor is best suited to craft solutions to the crisis. We find 
at support for the EU has been negatively affected overall, but that the EU 
still seen as the actor most suited to crafting a solution. We also demon-
.ate that the variables and models highlighted by the existing literature are 
able of capturing this downward trend in an appropriate way. Our main 
clusion is that it is the EU's failure to live up to this leadership expecta-
n that has caused its support and trust to plummet as much as it has. As 
ravcsik (1998) and Pollack (2001) have argued, the EU provides a kind 
·two-level game (Putnam 1988), making it possible to pursue policies at 
supranational level that are irrational or infeasible at the national one. We 
e that one underlying basis for EU support was this alternative route to 
licymaking. However, the relative failure to lead during the crisis has effec-
ely reduced this two-level game to a single playing field, and best accounts 
the decline in support observed. 
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THE CRISIS AND SUPPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN UNIO' 
artin oint of the crisis has generally been marked by the ba ~:~:~an ~~others on September 15, 2008. Table 12.1 presents achron. 
of some of the major ensuing events through 2011. d 11 
While there were precursor events, the sudden and unexpecte co . a. 
the Wall Street giant was the opening salvo of a gl_obal banking cns1. 
would subsequently evolve into a sovereign d~bt cns1s that now ap~ 
h . b'l"ty of the euro if not the EU itself. The effect thes threatentevrn11 ' · b · 
have had on support for the EU has been profound, and rt has. een ~ 
ressivel worse. For example, the Commission _notes m its revr f~~gS rin io12 Eurobarometer (No. 77), that "trust m the European 
p g . th tumn of 2011 and now stands at its lowest ever has fallen smce e au . . h 
0 
" 
(EU 2012, 13). Our primary goal is assess how well ex1stmg t e .•. 
support capture this decline. . d 0 
A common way to measure support for the EU is through an m ex-~• 
fair! common set of survey questions (e.g., Boomgaarden et al. 2011:: 
and ~illey 2009; McLaren 2006, 2002; Hoogbe and Marks 2005, 2004, 
1998a; Gabel and Palmer 1995). We continue this drawmg on Bo~:g 
et al., s (2011) notion that attitudes towards the EU should be m 
Table 12.1 A Timeline of the Crisis (2007-2011) 
Sept-Nov, 2007 
September 15, 2008 
December, 2008 
December, 2009 
March, 2010 
May, 2010 
November, 2010 
February, 2011 
May, 2011 
June, 2011 
September, 2011 
Pre-Crisis Survey: Eurobarometer 68.1 
Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy (crisis begins) 
EU leaders agree to a 200bn euro stimulus plan 
Greece admits its debt is more than double the eurozon_~; 
60°/o of GDP b rov; 
The eurozone approves a safety net for Greece, ut p _--:.;, 
loans d 10b I The first Greek bailout is announce (1 n euros 
Crisis Survey #7: Eurobarometer 73.4 
The Irish bailout is announced (85bn euros) --;;, 
The European Stability Mechanipm is announced (5000?: 
The Portuguese bailout is announced (78bn euros) '."' 
Crisis Survey-#2: Eurobarometer 75,3 
A second Greek bailout is announced (109bn.euros) IJ 
The Commission predicts eurozone growth wil! come .. · 
virtual standstill" 
Italy's debt rating is downgraded from A+ to A 
11 
.}" 
EU Commission President Barroso warns the EU faces, 
greatest cha I lenge" 
11 
• 
UK Foreign Secretary Hague calls the euro a burnrng 
with no exits" 
Source: Adapted from the BBC, 2012 (including quotations). 
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ltiple dimensions. While some of their five dimensions (performance, 
tity, affection, utilitarianism, and strengthening (-future integration/ 
pening and widening) cannot be captured due to the lack of appropriate 
lions, we construct an index based on the following: 
Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership 
·of the European Union is a good thing I neither good nor bad I bad thing? 
Taking everything into account, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) 
as on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European 
Union? 
general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, 
·r1y positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image? 
.. )ease tell me if you tend to trust [The European Union] or tend not to 
".trust it? 
e resulting 8-point index has been rescaled to 0-100 for ease of interpre-
on and serves as the dependent variable in the models and figures that 
w.'A primary concern for any index is internal consistency (reliability): 
f the components must be correlated, and measure the same underlying 
ept. To assess reliability, we use Cronbach's alpha (1951), which provides 
.. asure of the extent to which the items capture different facets of the same 
c construct, in this case support for the EU. The scale reliability score (a) 
the 4-item index is 0.79 for 2007; it is 0.81 and 0.73 for 2010 and 2011 
ectively. While the minimum alpha required "depends on how a measure is 
gused," alpha's greater than 0.7 imply at least a modest level ofreliahility 
.. values closer to 0.8 are generally accepted for the kind of survey-based 
used here (Nunnally 1978, 245; see also Lance et al. 2006).2 
s an additional check, we examined bow both the index and its compo-
s change over time. As seen in Figure 12.1, the index (support for the EU) 
· es after 2007. The concern therefore is that such movement should be 
d jointly by all of the components rather than being driven solely by one 
. While Cronhacb alphas around 0.8 suggest this is not the case, a con-
backed up by examining the pairwise correlation of the components, 
so compared the mean of each component (not shown) across time, 
ing that each one contributes to the overall downward trend as should 
pected from an index possessing sound internal consistency. 
ore 12.l shows the distribution of the mean level of support in the 27 
r states in each of the three years under examination. In pre-crisis 2007, 
U enjoyed fairly robust support with a meclian of 66.9 points, whereas in 
of the financial crisis the median of country averages fell to 59.0 and 57.0 
respectively. Noticeably absent during the crisis years are any member 
with an average level of support above 70; in 2007, there were eight. 
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2007 
F 12 1 Declining Support for the EU. This shows the distribution of the 27 .cou~-, ~~~~e lev~ls of support before (2007) and during the financial crisis. The. i:ned1an ~'., 
almost 67 in 2007, but had fallen to 59 by 201 O and to 57 by 2011 . The crisis years a,,~ 
show the absence of any countries with support above 70. Although the exact.num. 
is not conveyed by the upper tail in 2007, there were in fact ei?ht such countnes, w_l 
a maximum of just over 77 points in Ireland. By 2011, the maximum was only 67.8,_J:: 
Luxembourg. Source: Eurobarometer Nos. 68.1, 73.4, and 75.3. 
Given that this crisis has largely affected eurozone countries, we comp 
the change in support in and outside the eurozone (as of 2011). Figure 1 
shows a similar drop in support regardless of euro usage. While Greece ex 
rienced an especially large drop in support (-21.1 pomts between 2007 
2011 ), and Sweden actually managed a small half-point increase, the aver 
decrease in the two areas was nearly the same: -8. 7 pomts m the euroz 
and -8.1 points outside it. A one-way ANOV A (not shown) more fonn 
supports the claim of both equal means and vanances. 
EXPLAINING SUPPORT FOR THE EU 
Just as attitudes towards the EU are widely measured using indexes sucli;, 
this, they are also modeled as a function of a fairly widely accepted se~ 
factors. While the actual survey questions used vary by necessity, the un 
lying concepts for which they serve as proxies are well established. Th\ 
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:'figure 12.2 Change in Support 2011 vs 2007. This shows the change in the average 
leve! of support in each country between 2011 and 2007, separating the 17 countries 
that use the euro on the left from the 10 that do not on right. While outliers exist in 
_both groups, overall, the decline in support is not dependent on euro zone membership. 
Source; EB Nos. 75.3 and 68.1. 
models combine three schools of thought. First, the utilitarian perspective 
)11.odels attitudes towards integration as the result of cost-benefit assess-
)llents (see Christin 2005; Tucker et al. 2002; Gabel 1998a, 1998b; Anderson 
'and Reichert 1996; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). The central thesis is that 
'different groups ... experience different costs and benefits from" integration 
ith more educated and skilled individuals "having better opportunities to 
ply their talents internationally, creating a more positive attitude" towards 
e EU (Lubbers and Jaspers 2010, 24). The second perspective focuses on 
olitical values and the cues generally uninformed individuals use to formu-
ate opinions on the EU (see Hobolt 2006; Gabe! 1998b; Franklin et al. 1995). 
e central thesis here is that left parties are more hostile than right parties 
ecause they see the process as overly beneficial to the owners of capital, and 
less utility and benefit to labor. In addition, those more inclined to follow 
11d engage in political discussions are better able to comprehend and identify 
"th the fairly abstract concept of European integration (see Inglehart, Rabier 
d Reif 1991; Janssen 1991). The third school of thought focuses on how 
' tegration is or is not seen as a threat to national identity (see Lubbers and 
238 Jennifer R. Wozniak Boyle and Chris Hasselmann 
Scheepers 2010; McLaren 2006, 2002; De Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005;< 
Hooghe and Marks 2005). While many of the questions regarding national. 
verse EU attachment, or views on innnigration were unavailable in the three' 
Euro barometers used here, Lubbers and Jaspers note that those less educated· 
tend to "feature more nationalistic attitudes and consequently express 
stronger fears about" the EU (2010, 25). 
Steenbergen and Jones (2002) show that when data cluster in groups., 
such as individuals clustering in countries, a multilevel analysis is prefer", 
able to linear regression as the latter produces standard errors that are too.• 
small. Therefore, we use a two-level model to accommodate the country 
and individual-level nature of the data. Because the dependent variable is 
continuous but truncated on the scale 0-100 and not normally distributed, 
we fit a random intercept generalized linear model with a Gaussian link' 
function using GLLAMM within STATA.3 Since, as Tanasoiu and Colo'> 
nescu note, "it is reasonable to believe that the respondents have no particu' ·. 
lar motivation to refuse to answer some questions, ... we can safely assum~_ 
that our missing data are" missing at random, and hence amenable tq 
imputation (2008, 369). The imputation method used here is the Amelia II. 
program available within the R statistical package (Honaker et al. 2011).c 
Because each country surveyed has essentially the same number of respon-. 
dents (-1000), but very different populations, the data is weighted at the 
individual-level by each nation's share of the total EU population agecf 
15 and over; at the country level, all countries are weighted equally as th 
probability a country is included is 1.0 for all member states. The result~ 
are presented in Table 12.2. . . 
The single strongest predictor is whether or not one tends to trust one's 
own government; such trust in 2007 raised an individual's support by almos 
14.5 points (holding everything else constant). Not surprisingly, once the 
crisis began, such continued trust resulted in even higher levels of sup-' 
port for the EU. If one tends to trust one's government, then one is like!:{ 
to support its intergovermnental efforts, especially in times of crisis. Th~ 
next several predicators come in pairs, and each yields the expected results,_ 
Believing that the national economy will improve over the next 12 mon -'·· 
raises support (e.g., by 3.5 points in 2010) while believing it will worse. 
lowers it (e.g., by -2.5 in 2010). The same is true for expectations concern' 
ing one's own household financial situation; optimism yields higher suppo · 
(by 0.78 points in 2011) while pessimism lowers it (by-5.2 points in 2011 
The relative impact, however, such expectations have depends on wheth · 
the forecast concerns the national economy or one's household situatio 
When asked about the national economy over the coming year, a positi 
expectation consistently produces a larger increase in support than the co 
responding drop in support produced by a negative forecast: 5.37 vs -0.7 
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Table 12.2 Multilevel Models of Support for the EU 
2007 2010 2011 
Tend to trust national government 14.44 (0.29)' 19.10 (1.02)' 17.25 (0.84)' Expect Nat. economy to improve over 5.3 7 I0.71 I' 3.54 (1.03)' 4.69 (0.58)' 
coming yr. 
Expect Nat. economy to worsen over 
-0.71 (0.65) 
-2.51 (0.86)' 
-2.70 (1.00)' 
coming yr. 
Expect household Fin. Sit. to improve 
over coming yr. 
1.42 (0.38)' 0.53 (0.91) 0.78 (0.33)' 
Expect household Fin. Sit. to worsen 
-7.72 (0.36)' 
-6.34 (0.63)' 
-5.20 (0.68)' 
over coming yr. 
Higher educated 5.06 (0.34)' 7.91 (1.23)' 7.31 (0.92)' Lower educated 
Professional 
-4.04 (0.39)' 
-4.24 (0.69)' 
-3.49 (0.93)' 
Manual worker 
1.73 (0.62)' 3.37 (1.05)' 1.69 (0.65)' 
Frequently discuss politics 
-1 .89 (0.41)' 
-1.40 (1.30) 
-1.42 (0.96) 
Never discuss politics 
1.00 (0.39)' 1.14 (0.61) 0.87 (0.57) 
Left-Right self placement on 
-3.68 (0.32)' 
-4.64 (1.08)' 
-4.35 (1.05)' 
0-10 point scale 
0.47 (0.07)' 
-0.22 (0.29) 
-0.37 (0.32) 
Female 
-1.31 (0.28)' 
-2.17 (0.41)' Age -2.52 (0.62)' 
, Constant 
-0.05 (.01)' 
-0.06 (0.03) 
-0.06 (0.02)' 
Standard deviation of the residuals at 
62.94 (1.03)' 58.05 (2.24)' 55.00 (1.95)' 
21.97 23.45 23.28 the individual level 
Standard deviation of the country-
specific intercepts 
6.61 5.92 6.06 
N (individual level) 26,768 26,641 26,713 Log likelihood 
-120,750.06 
-121,903.52 
-122,029.69 
*Indicates p < 0.05 (standard errors in parentheses). 
1 in 2007; 3.54 vs -2.51 in 2010, and 4.69 vs -2.70 in 2011. The opposite 
IS true when 11 comes to one's personal situation. Optimistic forecasts now 
consistently ywld_much lower increases in support than the negative impact 
of more pessmust1c outlooks: 1.42 vs - 7.72 in 2007; 0.52 vs -6.34 in 2010 
and 0.78 vs -5.2 in 2011. In short, the reward the EU gets for good mac'. 
roecon01ruc expectat10ns IS greater than the punishment it gets for negative 
•· ?nes. When 11 comes to personal financial outlooks, however, the opposite 
IS true. 
· . The positive/negative pairings continue in regard to education and profes-
s10n. In 2010, respondents who finished their schooling after the age of 20, 
.or _were st1H studymg, were 7.91 points higher on the index than those who 
fimshed earlier; those_ who completed their education before the age of 15, or 
,had no formal education at all, were 4.24 points lower than would otherwise 
{be expected 1f everything else were held constant. Similarly professional 
;workers are more supportive while manual workers are less so, although not 
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. . Th. conforms to the utilitarian expectation aboJi 
always s1gmficantly so. is rt "t and who is likely to see it 
who is likely to see the EU as an oppo um y .• 
wage and labfor competi~n.downward trend in support, the model perfonns' 
In terms o captunng e . bl s do change their relevant impact 
as expected. While a num!er fo~:~~cli~e is captured by the constant ~ath 
the cns1s unfolds, the bu o . d . bl This is a good sign 
. h tically mforme vana e. 
than a substantive, t eore . ables highlighted in the literature ought 
the effect of the explanatory van . al . . If the coefficients were to su 
be fairly independent Of the financ1 CTIS!S. . "tude then we Wour 
denly change sign or significant!~ chan~e the~~ :~;~rt These coefficien 
have to revisit our theoretical un erstan mg d f the ;,,ost part they ar . 
ought to be fairly consistent. acr~ss tJ~~e a~ak:rof the EU' s largest ev .. 
~n~~~~al ~;~~!~~:~0:0t0;u;::~:~r~1tca~::t~ ;::~~en~~: :~e~:~~~!~~ 
their inclus10n. As seen m Ta e . b w 1 s than 3 points and on aver 
positive effect .on sup~ort, it do:~l;oha~ a e~ore negative effect on supp .•  ~y d:7 s~·7b~~:t:\:ane; ~~i:~s and on average db~ o~~ :C,~~t,;:~in:d T 
downward trend in support ough;.to :: 1~a~t~r~apt~ed by the 7 .94 decll 
8 point drop in thSe me:i' s:: p1;e~~~ors g~nerally maintain their expec 
rn the constant. o w e d · ht n supp 
effects, the crisis itself is acting as an overall drag or dea ';;:'1g EUo as Gab 
In short, the economic context matters when assessing e ' 
(1998a) and others have ihndicat~d. also be seen in the multilevel resul .. 
Fiually, the effects of t e cns1s cau . , . fr 
First, at the individual level, the dispers10~0~! ~h;l~~~l ;O~~o~~~::se t 
21.97 points in 2007 to ~v~; ~~o~:a~ly at the individual level, there 
effects of the cns1s are e d d by the model during the cri greater variance in the error term pro uce 
Table 12.3 Variables with the largest Change in Effect on Support for 
VS 2007 
Tend to trust national government 
Expect household finances to worsen 
Higher Educated 
Constant (expected value all else zero) 
Expect national economy to worsen 
Female 
. . 
Individuals are x Points More Support 
of the EU in 2011 
+2.81 Points 
+2.52 
+2.25 
Individuals are x Points Less Suppa 
of the EU in 2011 
-7.94 Points 
-1.99 
-1.21 
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· years. In other words, it is more difficult to model individual-level support 
during the crisis than it was before because the effects of the crisis are them-
. selves so variable at this level; some individuals were hurt more than others 
· in a way this model cannot fully predict. Second, reflecting the decline in 
,support seen in Figures 12. l and 12.2, the range of random country-level 
intercepts does not vary significantly in 2010 or 2011 from what it was in 
.2007, although there is slightly less dispersion (from 6.6 points in 2007, to 5.9 
and 6.1 in 2010 and 2011 respectively). This can also be seen in Figure 12.1, 
where the total range of support was smaller in 2010 and 2011 (-23 and 24 
points respectively) than it was in 2007 (-30 points). We interpret this to 
mean that the crisis, while hitting Greece perhaps harder than most, has truly 
been an EU-wide event. 
PUBLIC PREFERENCES AND A ROLE FOR THE EU 
'fhe first question in devising a solution to any crisis is to consider which actor 
is best suited to the task. In light of the downward shift in support for the EU 
.emonstrated above, one might reasonably conclude that Europeans sought 
adership during the crisis from elsewhere, such as national governments or 
ternational actors like the International Monetary Fund. In fact, given the 
· ternational nature of the crisis, as well as the considerable financial bur-
dens involved, a substantial (if not lead) role for the IMF was probably to be 
expected. While respondents were not asked which actor they thought should 
!ead, or which they preferred, they were asked in both 2010 and 2011 which 
actor they felt was "best able to take effective actions against the effects of the 
ancial and economic crisis" (EB 73.4, v368; EB 75.3, QC3a). Table 12.4 
ows the results and yields two main conclusions. First, despite the declin-
g support and trust demonstrated above, the EU was believed to be the 
ost effective actor moving forward; it was the plurality preference in both 
ars. In the interest of space, we omit a country-by-country presentation; 
owever, in 2010 the EU was the plurality preference in two-thirds of the 
ember states, and the first or second choice in 25 of the 27 countries. Sec-
.. nd, whether it was through the EU, the IMF, or the G20, there was a nearly 
.niversal preference for coordinated international action as opposed to each 
untry attempting to resolve the crisis on its own. Only in Romania, the UK, 
le 12.4 The Actor Most Ahle to Take Effective Action to Combat the Crisis 
Nat. Gov't EU us G20 IMF Other None 
17.8o/o 25.9 12.7 19.4 15.9 1 .4 6.9 18.6 28.6 12.6 18.7 14.9 1.3 5.3 
rce: Eurobarometer 73.4, Eurobarometer 75.3. 
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· h · ti al governme and Sweden did a plurality of respondents believe t elf na on . 
to be the most capable actor in terms of resolving the cnsis. G1v~n the histo 
between the EU and the latter two countries m partlcular, this is not tembl 
surprising. . · d all ber stat I 'tially this public expectation was actively resiste as .mem 
rn 1 t' t the Greek cns1s was Gree and EU institutions asserted that the so u wn o . ·• 
budget austerity, and not an EU or IMF financial rescue. At one level this 
to be expected, as no politician anywhere is ever in a rush to mform vot 
that their taxes must be used to bail out another actor, let alone anot 
try This hesitancy can clearly be seen in Germany' where althoug: 
conn · . M k 1 ry reluctant t the 2013 federal election was still years away, er e was ve . h' 
even broach the subject in 2010. At another. level, however, focusmg on~< 
bailouts misses the broader public expectall~n for EU leadership. After f 
the EU is capable of far more than just negotrntmg the exchange of funds 
bud et austerity. For example, as can be seen in Table 12.5, the public w. 
lsog quite adamant that the financial sector be brought to task for its role ~risis. Almost any EU proposal to curb the financial market was gmng to b 
embraced loudly and with considerable shadenfreu.de. . 
It is worth noting that when it came to financial market regulallon, t, 
British were essentially in lockstep with their contmental cousms. So whi 
the British government was the most vocal critic of such. measures, th 
is little evidence to suggest that the British public shared its gove~nment 
concerns. In fact, when it came to regulating wages m the financi53 ~~t 
the British were more virulent supporters than the EU as a whole ( . : 
48.6% ). d h' b' ed with We argue that this public expectation for EU lea ers ip com m 
. . l'kelihood of sovereign defaults is what accounts for the rever 1ncreas1ng 1 
Table 12.5 Regulation of the financial Industry (2011) 
Tougher rules on tax avoidance and tax 
havens 
The introduction of a tax on profits 
made by banks . . 
The introduction of tax on f1nanc1al 
transactions 
The regulation of wages in the financial 
sector (i.e., trader's bonuses) 
Increasing transparency of financial 
markets 
Strongly in Fairly in 
Favor1 Favor 
EU: 62.5°/o 
UK: 64.0 
EU: 52.0 
UK: 56.3 
EU: 33.1 
UK: 23.2 
EU: 48.6 
UK: 53.4 
EU: 57.0 
UK: 54.3 
30.5 
29.2 
35.6 
31.3 
37.8 
36.0 
39.1 
33.8 
38.0 
40.4 
Fairly 
Opposed 
5.4 
4.5 
9.0 
8.5 
20.2 
25.2 
9.2 
8.7 
4.0 
4.1 
Strong 
Oppos 
1.6 
23 
3.4 
4.0 
8.9 
15.6 
3.1 
4.1 
1.0 
1.2 
1 d" h UK with the UK figures provided separ 1The percentage of respondents across the EU, exc u mg t e ' 
Source: Eurobarometer 75.3. 
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. of member state and EU opposition. When reluctantly forced to admit the 
problem would not just go away, the EU found itself divided into two camps 
over whether the IMF or EU should take the lead. Most member states, par-
ticularly France and Spain, along with the Commission and the ECB favored 
· an EU-led rescue, while Germany, Finland, and the Netherlands favored an 
IMF led effort (Barber and Wiesmann 2010; Thomson 2010). These patterns 
are largely consistent with public opinion in each state, as for example, a plu-
rality of Finns (31 % ) believed the IMF to be the most capable actor whereas 
•:over one-third of Spaniards felt the EU likely to be most effective. In the end, 
· the natural compromise was arrived at: a jointly funded rescue tied to Greek 
·austerity (European Commission 2010). 
CONCLUSION 
Except within Sweden, the financial crisis has significantly weakened sup-
.. jJort for the EU, and this decline in support is independent of eurozone 
embership. Our primary goal was to assess how well existing models of 
.EU support account for this decline. In terms of the variables routinely high-
' lighted by the literature, the results hold up well. Each factor has the effect 
we have come to expect it to have: a highly educated, male, professional 
orker with positive expectations for his household finances and national 
'economy who also trusts his government is much more supportive (expected 
support = 86. 7 points), than a lower educated, female, manual worker with 
,negative economic outlooks who never discusses politics and has little 
,trust in her government (36. 7 points). In short, the financial crisis does not 
equire us to revisit our theoretical understanding of support for the EU; the 
, xisting models and variables continue to perform largely as expected. Our 
. esults also confirm that a multilevel design best captures the nested nature 
pf EU-wide public opinion data. 
We also demonstrate that despite this decline in support, the EU remains 
en as the actor most likely to be effective at dealing with the crisis, ahead 
either the IMF or national governments. We believe this expectation for 
dership helps us understand in part why the crisis has produced such a 
g on support. Figure 12.3 charts the changing degree of trust in both 
e EU and national political institutions. In the fall of 2004, one of these 
titutions, the EU, was unlike the others. Whereas half the respondents 
sted the EU, 38 percent trusted their own parliaments, and only about 
ne-third trusted their actual government. However, the spring of 2012, 
e three institutions were essentially perceived the same way with only 31 
. rcent trusting the EU and 28 percent trusting either their own parliament 
r government. Why the fall from grace? 
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Fi ure 12.3 The Declining Trust in Political Institutions. T~is show: the c~angi 
g tion of the EU vis-a-vis national governments and parliaments 1n th: ~1~nnu ~~~~:rometers (fall and spring). In the fall of 2004, the EU was truste~ s1gnif1c~~ 
more than either domestic institution. However, by the spnng of 201~, t er.e ~as. I 
difference between the three as the EU had sunk to the level of the national 1nst1tut1on_ 
Source: European Commission 2012, 13. 
While the gap began to narrow in. the fall of 2009, we. argue it is j · 
too simplistic to say that the crisis is to blame because domg so does n 
really explain why support fell, or why the EU failed to get any credit £ 
the moves it did take. However, when placed alongside the public expect 
tion for leadership demonstrated above, the picture becomes a bit cleare 
We believe the convergence shows that the pU has come to be seen as J : 
th t full Of squabbling delegates with httle real leaders ano er govemmen , . h · ·· 
and precious few accomplishments. While the EU is not seen as avr 
caused the crisis, the responsibility for which most seem to. level square 
th bankers the EU clearly failed to (1) prevent the cnsis, (2) do muc 
upon e , · · (3) ac 
of anything to resolve it, and more importantly perhaps it 1s seen as . 
ally making matters worse through its enforced austenty (see the var10 
protest marches in Greece for example) and bailouts (see the var10us prot 
marches in any of several northern European countries). We also belie 
that this convergence can help explain why the EU used to be seen farm 
positively and trustworthy. 
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Moravcsik (1998) and Pollack (2001) have argued that the EU provides a 
kind of two-level game (Putnam 1988), making it possible to pursue policies 
at the supranational level that are irrational or infeasible at the national one. 
We argue a similar kind of two-level game exists for voters (citizens) as well. 
The real benefit of the EU is not as a possible replacement for national gov-
ernments in some kind of federal Europe, or even in an ever closer union, but 
as an insurance policy or alternative in cases where national political actors 
·and institutions fall short. In most Eurozone countries for example, the EU 
and the euro were supported because they delivered something national poli-
ticians could not: economic growth with lower inflation. Like any political 
entity, the EU has its share of detractors and skeptics, but even when things 
went wrong, such as with the earlier attempts at exchange rate coordination 
in the ERM for example, much the blame fell on the national governments 
for not getting it right rather than on the EU for having proposed such a silly 
·idea in the first place. Now for the first time since the "empty-chair crisis" 
.and the eurosclerosis of the 1970s, the EU is being seen as suffering from 
the same ills that have long befallen national governments, namely a failure 
of leadership and the inability to adopt sound public policies that actually 
.deal with a real-world problem. If the EU is going to just as ineffective as the 
national level, then it will be supported accordingly. In other words, for too 
any Europeans, the game looks increasingly the same regardless of which 
level one looks at. The only effective actor in the entire crisis so far been the 
.ECB, and all Europe's central bankers really did was buy the politicians time 
·by calming the bond markets with their promise to do whatever is necessary. 
The problem for the ECB and everyone else is that so far, Europe's leaders 
ave made precious little use of the time they have been given. One hope is 
that now that the long awaited German election is over, and returned Merkel 
to power, it might become possible for the EU take more forceful action in 
bringing the crisis to a close by enacting much needed reforms in areas such 
as the labor market, the internal market for services, and competitiveness. 
the absence of such EU-led reforms that deliver concrete results, sup-
ort will likely remain where it is alongside generally distrusted national 
institutions. 
NOTES 
1. The index components were recoded so that more supportive attitudes are scored 
igher. The range is 0-8: 0-2 points from component item #1, 0-1 points from item 
2, 0-4 points from item #3, 0-1 points from item #4. Non-responses were imputed 
y multiple imputation usingAn1elia II (Honaker et al. 2011). This imputation renders 
'.' ach of the components as continuous on the scale indicated. 
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2. Nunna1ly's (1978) discussion makes it clear that ~e mi~i~um r~lia~ility ~e~d.ed:; 
rises with intended use. For experimental treatments 1n a cltn1cal trial, a reliab1hty 
of 0.95 should be considered the desirable standard" (pp. 245-6). The benchmark of· 
0.7 is widely used in social science, although Nunnally indicates that values clos~r tO:',, 
0.8 arc better suited for basic research (see also Lance et al. 2006). On the basis of. 
the Cronbach alphas (2 of 3 at ~0.8), and in conjunction with the other assessments 
of the index described herein, we confident we have a reliable index. 
3. Generalized linear models allow for the dependent variable to be distributed 
non-normally, which ours is. The Hnk function is a means of transforming t~t:; 
expected value of the non-normal dependent variable to the line~ indepe~dent. van~­
ables. A Gaussian link is an identity function; it is the default setting and 1s typically 
used in such models. Do-files for each year available upon request. 
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Chapter 13 
Implications of the Greek Crisis 
Nationalism, Enemy Stereotypes, 
and the European Union 
Zinovia Lialiouti and Giorgos Bithymitris 
This chapter discusses identity issues and their framing in the context of 
'the Greek crisis. We explore recent developments in Greek nationalism, 
namely changes in the national self-image, the perception of enmity, and 
·the ideological processes that have affected Greek political culture and its 
relationship with Europe. The conceptualization and discursive articulation 
Of an "us-and-them" dichotomy in current public discourse is at the center of 
our study. To this end, we discuss empirical material collected from various 
ources (political discourse, party programmatic declarations, mass media, 
nd opinion polls). Our approach blends together qualitative and quantitative 
alysis (Standard Eurobarometer, European Commission 2009; 2010; 2011; 
Ol2a; 2013). The temporal focus of our research, while covering the entire 
eriod of the Greek crisis (2010--2014), is centered within the timeframe of 
e 2014 Elections for Members of the European Parliament (January-May 
014). Our principal hypothesis is that the 2014 European elections highlight 
erceptions of self and otherness, as well as enemy stereotypes, and are of 
ignificant for two reasons: (i) they were the first EU elections taking place 
the context of such an acute economic and social crisis, (ii) the elections 
ok place at a critical political phase. Following four years of deep reces-
n and austerity policies, the government was able to achieve a primary 
rplns and Greece returned to the bond markets. The coalition government 
nstructed a "success story" narrative based on these achievements and 
·.· ued that they marked the beginning of the end for the Greek crisis and 
country's return to normalcy. By contrast, the opposition emphasized the 
uring social problems, high unemployment and poverty rates, and insisted 
t the crisis was far from being over. The election period was a test for both 
terpretations. 
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